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This  paper  examines  whether  production  efficiency  is attained  in a  capitalistic 
class economy  where  complete contracts are not available.  It  is  shown  that 
such  an  economy  often  fails to  achieve  production  efficiency. 1  Introduction 
The  views and  evaluations for the capitalistic production system  is  very dif 
ferent among  several economics  schools, in particular between  the  neoclassical 
economics  and  the  Marxian  economics.  From  the  neoclassical economics  point 
of view, the capitalistic production system is  formed and  sustained because 
of  its comparative production efficiency.  *  Marxian  economics, on the other 
hand, tries to explain this as the result of pursuit of a  larger share of  the pie 
by  the owner  of the assets for production (or the "means  of  production").  2 
According  to  the  latter perspective, the  capitalistic production  is not  necessar 
ily efficient, since the  owners  of  the assets for production may  try to maintain 
their power  over the laborers at a  sacrifice of  production  efficiency.  There  are 
few  formal works, however, that concretely spelled out what those inefficien 
cies are  and  in  what  mechanisms  those  inefficiencies realize.  The  present paper 
attempts  to give an  explanation to those questions in a  formal model. 
In  an  ideal economy  where  complete  contracting  is available, like a  perfectly 
competitive economy of the  neoclassical economics  type,  there  is  no room 
for inefficiency in capitalistic production.  3  Recently, however, focus on the 
limitation  of  human  rationality has  shifted our  research interests from  such  an 
ideal economy to the world where complete contracting is  not available.  In 
the  present paper, I  consider a  capitalistic class economy  where  contracts are 
necessarily incomplete, and  show  that  it  is often  difficult to attain production 
efficiency in that economy. 
The  construction of  the  rest of  the paper  is as follows.  In the next section, 
I  construct a simple model of a capitalistic  class economy where complete 
contracting is  not available.  Then, section  3 examines whether production 
efficiency is attained in that economy. The  model  developed  in sections 2 and 
3  is a  quite general one.  So, to be concrete, section 4 is  devoted to consider 
integration and separation of the ownership of the firm as an illustration  of 
the  inefficiency problem  discussed  in sections 2 and  3.  The  paper  is concluded 
in  section 5. 
2  The  Model 
Let S  =  (TV, A) be a  subeconomy where TV = {k,  1}  is  the set of agents and 
A  is  the set of assets for production.  Agent k is  the owner  of the assets for 
production, and  agent  /  is  the  laborer. 
The  production by  k and  /  proceeds  in the following  order. 
e,  for instance, Milgrom-Roberts (1992), chapter 2. 
2See, for instance, Marglin (1974) and  Bowles (1985). 
3See  Samuelson (1957). (Proof) 
(1) By  Lemma  together with (A.3), the results are obtained. 
(2) In Case  1,  given any  x  €  X,  since  p£  (x) >  p{{x) by  Lemma,  k  takes 9s. 
Given  that k  takes 9s, since  pf  (x2) >  p?(zi) by  (A.3),  /  takes x2.  In Case  2, 
given any x e X, since pi(x)  >  Pk(x) by Lemma, k takes 91.  Given that  fe 
takes 91, sincepf  (2:2)  >  Pi(xi) by (A.3), /  takes x2. 
(3)  First consider Case  1.  Given  91, since  pf  (a^) >  p/(x2) by (A.3), /  takes 
x\.  Given 05,  since pf{x2)  > pf{xi)  by  (A.3),  /  takes  x2.  Given this,  if 
p$(x2) >  p{(xi), k  takes 9s, and  if p[(x{) >  Pkfa), k takes &  - Next  consider 
Case  2.  Given  61, since  pf  (x2) >  pf  (^i),  /  takes ^2.  Given  6s, since pf  (xi) > 
pf{x2) by (A.3), /  takes sci.  Given  this,  if pi{x2) >  pf(xi),  A;  takes 91, and  if 
rf  k  takes ^- D 
It has been noted  in the previous sections that the  order  9 and  x  are taken 
depends  on  cases.  As  for  the  integration  and  separation  of  the  ownership  of  the 
firm,  it seems  that  while  it usually  takes  for  years  for  employees  to  make  a  firm-
specific investment, merger  and  separation plans are often disclosed suddenly 
and they are done  pretty soon  after the announcement.  If it  is  the case, the 
second case in Proposition seems most likely,  or,  if information on ownership 
and  investment  is not  revealed  easily, the  first case may  be  plausible.  In either 
case, the production  outcome  is  inefficient. 
5  Conclusion 
In  this  paper  I considered  whether  production  efficiency  is attained  in  a  capital 
istic class economy  under  incomplete  contracts.  It was  shown  that overall the 
production  efficiency  is hard  to be  achieved  in such  an  economy. As  a  concrete 
example,  I  took  the  problem  of  integration and  separation of  the ownership  of 
the  firm and  illustrated the  difficulty of  attaining production efficiency in the 
economy  of  this type. 
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